





































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-19; J2-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.




% REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1509
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W


















SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA 1
54V76AII4R J2-19; J2-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-38; J2-26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W ..... _
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
INDEPENDENT OR_ ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





2 ) CONTRO LS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A .......






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA 1
54V76AII4R J2-38; J2"26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-91; J2-98
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1513
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W

















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES













LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R 72-91; J2-98
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-10; J2-93
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1515
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-10; J2-93
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.




















































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-9; J2-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES












c [ ] _-
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-9; J2-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-92; J2-16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1519
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-92; J2-16 .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO THE GPC.





































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2"20; J2-86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1521
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAy 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-20_ J2-86' ...... _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT_ TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO THE GPC.



























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J2-59; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION..
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1523
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES













LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14R J2-59; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.







































































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AlI5R J2-89; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATI ON:
P_T NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76AIISR J2-89; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAI_BLE TO GPC.





























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISR J2-76; Ji-62
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
w









ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT i



















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2 _
PART NUMBER: 55V76All5R J2-76; JI-62 ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.























REFE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK _ I
i





































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AllSR J2-91; J2-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1529
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76AIISR J2-91; J2-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.






































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISR J2-95; J2-19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
l
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1531
iINDEPENDENT ORBITERLASSE_SM_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-95; J2-i9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.


































DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AlI5R J2-92; J2-18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.

































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-92; J2-18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS_ A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV'BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISR J2-90; J2-26
] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1535
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES













LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-90_ J2-26_ _i_iii.. i.._
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TA_BACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO THE GPC.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-81; J2-28
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1537
lINDEPENDEN_QRBITER ASSESSMENT.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:




ITEM: _SISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT









3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM



















RED_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76AII5R J2-81; J2-28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAI_BLE TO THE GPC.



































































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5R J2-86; Ji-49
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE"
MOTORS WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO
MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS
MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR
OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION..
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1539
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES







REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
m
mm
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.

















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J3-I18; AIR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1541
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W_




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
......CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AlI6 J3-118; AIR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.






































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J3-i18;; AIR8
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1543
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-i18;; AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.










































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-75; A3R6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES
UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC
POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN VALVE
COMMAND S END. PROLONGED POWER T0 VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
ALSO LOSE THE TWO "OX ISOL VALVE" POSITION TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1545
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
























AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76A116 J2-75 ;A3R6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70'943099 _9 B _O Bf2; JSe iilV4;_ SPACE SHUTTLE




























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-55; A3R4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX XFEED 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN OR CLOSE VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI27 JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1547
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W _c
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-55; A3R4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-56;; A2RI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
= r
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1549
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J2-56;; A2R13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ .].
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J2-65; A3R5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
t
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1551
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-65; A3R5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TA_BACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A116 J2-31; J5-41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
t REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1652 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-31; J5-41
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECTS. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESS_



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV I/2 .......
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY .SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD •
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TAIlbACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
.... , , =


























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1557
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-81; J3-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE"IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J6-1; AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1559
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AiI4 J6-1; _AIR20 ......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76All4R J6-1;; J3-89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1561
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AlI4R J6-1;; J3-89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J3-85; A3R8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN VALVE
COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
ALSO LOSE THE TWO "OX ISOL VALVE" POSITION TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
m REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1563
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76All4 J3-85; A3R8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1,2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J3-56; A3R9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN OR CLOSE VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1565
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-56; A3R9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK l
n




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76All4R J6-60; J2-79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1567
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA 1
54V76AII4R J6-60; J2-79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AlI4 J3-77; A3RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
"AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF
NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1569
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J3-77; A3RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.

























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-59;; J2-78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1571
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] .......
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-59;; J2-78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECTS. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
























































3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AlI4 J6-2; AIR19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1573
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBsYSTEM _ALYS iS _W_KSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:












3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5





SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 _ ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J6-2; AIR19 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
.... z......







































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-2; J3-88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1575
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSM_ENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_KEHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4R J6-2; J3-88 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE _GE. _
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

































































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A115 J1-31; J1-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 1 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
M
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1577
INDEPENDENT ORBiTER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABO_T HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-31; JI-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





































DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-32; Ji-88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1579
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W _:_z__ _
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
¢RITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 JI-32; Ji-88 ..........
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK .... _.... _ Im
[]






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 Ji-21; Ji-75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1581
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_W_RKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CR!T_CALI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCy SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] :::
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-21; Ji-75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Jl-12; JI-73
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1583
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART _MBER:
AV BAY 5, MCA 2
55V76Al15 Jl-12; Ji-73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.



































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOR_SHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Ji-68; Ji-65
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 1 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1585
: =
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Ji-68; JI-65
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 JI-22; Ji-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1587
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 AT0: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI15 J1-22; J1-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5 Jl-13; Ji-72
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76All5 Jl-13; J1-72
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-24; J2-8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 2 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1591
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES















AV BAY 5, M CA 2
54V76AII4 J2-24/ J2-8 .... _ .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE














ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A. [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-45; J2-35
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.






REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1593
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, M CA 2
S4V76AIi4 J2-45; J2-35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76A114 J2-3; J2-60
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1595
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W _
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-3; J2-60
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI14 J2-2; J2-95
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1597
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & F_ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT












LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-2; J2-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, 0VER_AD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.






































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-30; J2-53
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1599
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES













LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2 ...........
PART NUMBER: 54V76A114 J2-30; J2-53
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK .............. m
I
I











ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-6; J2-61
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1601
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUN¢
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 J2-6; J2-61
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TAU<BACKIS STILLAVAIU BLETO GPC.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76A114 J2-4; J2-97
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i,
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1603
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM















B [ ] _C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 54V76Al14 J2-4; J2-97 .....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AlI6 J2-69; ASR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR 'WAFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 3 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
m REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC II174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU iSOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: _A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-69; A5R6 _ _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-68; ASR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1607
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-68; A5R2 _ .... _ _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















































3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-32; A2R27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1609
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, M CA 3
56V76AlI6 J2-32; A2R27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-34; A2R29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1611
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76Al16 J2-34; A2R29 _-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.





















































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-91; A4RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 3 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1613
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-91; A4RI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-33; A2R30
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR 'fOX MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1615
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, M CA 3
56V76AII6 J2-33_ A2R30 _ _;_;
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J2-45; A2R28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1617
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FUISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [. ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-45; A2R28 .:._ ...... i _ i
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN









2 ) CONTRO LS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; ASR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 4 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
=




L_ REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1619
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; ASR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHO'CK, OVER_AD .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TA_BACK IS STILL AVAILABLETO GPC.


































































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; AIR24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.






REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1621
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-74; AIR24
CAUSE S:C___0NT_AMINATION,_ vIBRATION' MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC. /





































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-23; A2R44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1623
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-23; A2R44 ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GP C.


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J3-45; A2R47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
w




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1625
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ - ABORT












LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART _MB_.R: 56V76AII6 J3-45; A2R47 _ ...........
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-73; A3RI0
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE 'fOX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 4 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS
GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN
VALVE COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT. ALSO LOSE VALVE POSITION TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1627
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3 ....
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16 J3-73; A3Ri0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-34; A2R46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1629
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-34; A2R46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
D




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J3-46; A2R48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIF 4 iSOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
u
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J3-46; A2R48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2;
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK "



























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-43; R125
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR
"MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1633
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J2-43; R!25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE POSITION. LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OA1, SO PROVIDESI
_LL _(0 _8_ vD_f_:STE_D __F_:m_LF_ To 14_) WLTA_ _.























































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-43; J2-29
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE POSITION' LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OAI, SO PROVIDES
FULL (0 TO 28 VDC) INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1635
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W




















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J2-43; J2-29 _ _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
CLOSE PO_T_QN, SWITCH OPE_TION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-42; J2-27
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" SWITCH IN
OPEN POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE
ISOL VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.









DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-42; J2-27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-46; RII8
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.








REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1639
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


















3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-46; RII8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:









































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-41; RI21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1641
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [. ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-41; RI21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J8-66; R120
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE FOUR TALKBACKS FOR OPEN AND CLOSED POSITIONS OF BOTH "OX
& FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES". ALSO LOSE INHIBITS TO STOP OPENING
OR CLOSING VALVES WHEN THEY ARE FULLY OPENED OR CLOSED,
RESPECTIVELY, BUT THIS WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVES. ALSO LOSE
INHIBITS TO STOP OPENING OR CLOSING VALVES WHEN THEy ARE FULLY
OPENED OR CLOSED, RESPECTIVELY, BUT THIS WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1643
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:








PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BE ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J8-66; RI20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-45; RII9
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.








REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1645
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT


















ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS _ _
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS _
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W _ .......
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3 ....
56V76AI23R J2-45; RII9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-40; R122
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK "FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION.
VALVE OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1647
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-40; R122
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH
FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE
CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE,
THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM CONTACT SET i, 2,
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER
THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPEL_LA/_TS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TAN}( LANDING ........
WEIGHT CON-STRA_TS AND/_OR TH--ECG SA?ETY B()UNDARIES, AND MAY
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.

















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION._













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM i_ _ :_: _ _i!_
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: _CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL ....
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDA/_CY PROVIDED B_YTHE MDM COMMANDS, IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTRgL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN _.....
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY,
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, _DMAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING RT_LS ABORTS TO MEET THET_K--_"LANbING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK _SOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73ATSI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1651
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI6; S19
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF
OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR
CLOSED BY THE SWITCHOR BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND
ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT
ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.







































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $16; PNL 07 $19
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI6; S19
c [p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH
SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR
GPC POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS,
AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1653
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1654
I
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
r
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1655
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE _CON-T_T-S- FAiL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S-19 _
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S16; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH
SETS OF CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF EITHER THE INDIVIDUAL
VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL AFFECT pROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND
MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS
TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS AND THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS. IF EITHER SETS OF CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT
POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC












LIR OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 112 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OpEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.











SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7S16; $19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY,
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.



































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7S16; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1659
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
g
i
















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7S16; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1661
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $16; PNL 07 $19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: v
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH
SETS OF CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF EITHER THE INDIVIDUAL
VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC






































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS II, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $16; PNL 07 $19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN'THAT POSITIONAND CAN BE
OPENED OR CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. WORST CASE FAILURE
OF EITHER THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMANDS
WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY,
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1663
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITYDATE:
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1762 ABORT:
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.







3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B :






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73ATS20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM OPEN COMMANDS, AND BY THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE ONLY TO OPEN THE VALVE. VALVE CANNOT BE
CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. IF THE
VALVE IS VALVE IS OPEN WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURS, AND THE MDM CLOSE
COMMAND PATH FAILS, THIS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS
DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PR6__T DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES,
AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WiLL--RE-MAIN CLOSED/ CAN BE OPENED ONLY
BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE RECLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT LANDING
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1665
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN CLOSED POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C.[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SI7, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY
SWITCH OR GPC COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE
THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN,
AND CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE REOPENED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE vALvE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT LANDING
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB

































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: "A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS OR BY THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND
CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
w
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1667
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SW OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: "PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI7, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE FALVE
WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. IF THE
OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED
POSIT;ON J THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY
SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE RECLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM
THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF EITHEROF THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE MDM COMMANDS WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB





































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.














PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7S17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
L
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.














PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 5/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73ATSIT, S18; 33V73ATS20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS OR BY THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND
CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.



































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.














PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SIT, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY
BY MDM COMMAND, AND CAN BR OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO
CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE
CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK WEIGHT LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1671
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1770 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
0NORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $17, $18; PNL 07 $20, $2!
33V73ATS17, S18; 33V73A7S20, $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
GPC COMMAND. IF THECLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN, AND CAN BE
CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE REOPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER OF THE INDIVIDUAL VALVE MDM
COMMANDS WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK WEIGHT LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM CONTACT SETS I, 2, AND THEN
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER THE
INDIVIDUAL VALVE OR DUAL VALVE MDM COMMANDS WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1673
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS AND THEN
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS OR TAL ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES,
AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ....... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BVY MDM COMMANDS. TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USETHE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1675
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSS?EED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73ATS32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
















REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1676
m
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL O7 $32; PNL 07 $34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MEM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1677
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD m
I
m
















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73ATS32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
_=
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1679
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
g
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L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1681
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.




































L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73ATS32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MEM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1683
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & _ CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.









3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & _ CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRIT!CALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:



































L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, l0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1685
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 S34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S32; $34
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY


















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
g
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:








L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENs: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCHIS CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1687
INDEPENDENT QRB_TER ASSESSMENT










MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RCS/RCS CROSSFEED IS POSSIBLE ONLY FROM THE RIGHT OR ONLY FROM
THE LEFT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CD
W
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN OFF POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE GPC CONTROLLED RCS/RCS
CROSSFEED. CROSSFEED CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MDM COMMANDS OR BY
MANUAL RCS SWITCH RECONFIGURATION.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND
MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS
TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1689
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1788 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN.




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _i i
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CROSSFEED CAN BE CONTROLLED BY MDM COMMANDS, OR BY MANUAL RCS
SWITCH RECONFIGURATION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.



































ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED.




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV _/2 & 3/4/5







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RCS/RCS CROSSFEED IS POSSIBLE ONLY FROM THE RIGHT OR ONLY FROM
THE LEFT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
=
mmm
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1691
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_SuBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX & FU CROSS FEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMANDS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW
MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM CONTACT SET I, 2, AND THEN
USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF EITHER THE















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD g
J
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1692
? _-
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1791 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED
BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM TREE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS OR TAL ABORTS
TO MEEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
i/22/--87 HI GHEST CRITI CALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1792 ABORT:
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.
















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35 ......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS, TO
OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/ORO THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT
ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1695
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS I, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE sWITcH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, AND CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD; FLIGHT RULE 6-95




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 5/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
m
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1697
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1796 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.+










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: K [ ] B [
LOCATION: PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S33; $35
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD I
m

















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CO,ACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1699
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 3 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SET OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, ?ALLURE OF ALLREDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY _D MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN
ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CS SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.







































L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORB IT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33 ; S35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS' IF EITHER SETS OF OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
BURN ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TAK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
i
¢C
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1701
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER _sUBSYSTEM _ALYSI_ _WO_EET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHESTCRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R ox _ _ CROSSFEEDVLV 3/4/5 SWITCH_PEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS
OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED _ILE THE SWITCH IS IN OPEN OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMM_D. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY SWITCH COMMANDS, _D CANNOT
BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMANDS. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE
CREW_ST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND
THEN USE THE GPC READ/MITE PROCEDURES. FAILU_ OF ALL
_D_D_CY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPE_TIONS.





































L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1703
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
r
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1802 ABORT:
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 9, i0
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 S35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD l
mm


















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I 0 N:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER OR BOTH SETS OF
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
COMMANDS, ONLY BY MDM COMMANDS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES : VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1705
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/SSWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 ......
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRZTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: .3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF EITHER SET OF CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION AND CAN BE OPENED OR CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO BURN ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CS SAFETY BOUNDARIES. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL
BUSSES AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; S27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSEDBYSWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
z
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1707
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1806 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.













3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
PA_T NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; $27
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC .............
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY sWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
w












ITEM: MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CO,ACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM ...........
MANIFOLD I, L/R o_'_:_'_OL VLvS ::
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P']
LOCATION: PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMMAND,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTH SDUMPS DURING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.













































MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S22; PNL 07 $27
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S22; S27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1711
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE I
I
m








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD l, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22 ; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE















MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 $27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMm_DS. iF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOLVLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; PNL 07 .$27
33V73A7S22; $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUSTREMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PRO
CEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1715
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3 / 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OpEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. _ TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILUREOF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73ATS23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILLCLOSE AND CANNOTBEOPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1717
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.











ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS _ ....
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & F-u_SOL VLVS _
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBiT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART" NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMMAND,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DUMPS DURING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOS AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1719
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.



































MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1721
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






































MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; S28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1723
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23; PNL 07 $28
33V73A7S23; $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PRO
CEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TAK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH?_ILS=INTHE OPEN POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1725
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1824 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.














PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.



















REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1726
I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
cAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE

















SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
M_IFOLD 3, L/R OX & _ ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CO,ACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE _W/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
_CATION: PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
PUT _MBER: 33V73ATS24; $29
c[p]
CAUSES: CO_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, _E_AL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIO_ _
_D_D_CY PROVIDED BY THE MDM oPEN COMM_DS. _ IF THE oPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN _T POSITION, C_ BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMM_D,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, _E C_ _ST _MOVE CONTROL BUS POWER _OM THE CO,ACTS,
_D THEN USE GPC READ/_ITE_ PROCED_S. FAIL_ OF ALL
RED_D_CY WILL AFFECT PROPEL_T DUMP LENGTHS DUMPS D_ING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPEL_T D_ING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE T_K _DING WEIGHT
CONST_INTS _D/OR THE CG SAFETY BO_D_IES, _D MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs _D _Is.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 _V B EO B12, DF, CF























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1729
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: -MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM .....
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
PART NUMBER: 33V73ATS24; $29
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE ."
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DE, CE
= ,
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1731
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C j C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLy BY MDM COMMAND.
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
w

















MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; PNL 07 $29
33V73A7S24; $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILLREMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1733
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: .A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE
OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL
BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DF, CF
I
w








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPEED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CONTROL BUSSES AND USE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1735
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE_BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE SWITCH WHILE THE VALVE IS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND FAILURE OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL VALVE
AND DUAL VALVE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATHS WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND
MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN COMMAND 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73ATS25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED ONLY BY MDM COMMAND,
AND CAN CLOSE BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CONTACTS,
AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DUMPS DURING
ABORTS OR ENTRY, MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1737
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VL_SWITCH OPEN COMMAND i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND.
IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSEDAND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUYT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC COMMAND 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1739
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
COMMAND 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC COMMAND 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DE, CE
w
m








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:. 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE COMMAND 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPEED BY SWITCH COMMAND, BUT
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B I2, DF, CF















MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.












PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE COMMAND 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; PNL 07 $30
33V73A7S25; $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT PROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITYTO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
DURING ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES, AND MAY AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DF, CF











































MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO CLOSE THE VALVE. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE OPEN POSITION WHILE THE VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN. FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1743
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1842 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION











SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITIONWHILETHE VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL CLOSE. IF THE MDM OPEN COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, OR
THE SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT THE VALVE WILL CYCLE
OPEN AND CLOSED UNTIL THE MDM OR SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS REMOVED,
OR UNTIL THE CONTROL BUS POWER IS REMOVED FROM EITHER OF THE
SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, CREW MUST REMOVE
!POWER FROM EITHER OF THE SWITCH S CLOSE CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPREATIONS, AND WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.






































MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. IF THE
VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATH FAILS, THE VALVE
CANNOT BE OPENED BY THE MDM SWITCH COMMANDS, CAUSING THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
F
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1745
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS I, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU _SOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1746
w
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
u
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1747
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _ _
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU_SOL_VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA i
m
m





DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
L_
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1749
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1848 ABORT: 3/3
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73ATS26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANYPOSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY
THE MDM COMMAND, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY THE SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY
BY THE MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE






















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA u
w








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS AND THE OTHER SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE GPC OR CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE,
AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY MDM COMMAND, ONLY BY THE SWITCH COMMAND.
IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM
COMMAND, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE
WITH THE MDM COMMAND, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM
THE CLOSE CONTACT SET 5,6 THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1751
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1850 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN









3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU_ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONOI_T: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LA/_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMM_D. IF THE OPEN ...........
CONTACTS A_ OPEN WH_LE T_C_ IS IN A_Y POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE, AND WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.





























DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73ATS26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO CLOSE THE VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, OR IF THE MDM CLOSE
COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, THE VALVE WILL CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSED
UNTIL CONTROL BUS POWER TO THE OPEN OR CLOSE CONTACTS IS REMOVED,
OR UNTIL THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND IS REMOVED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1753
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS W0_SHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOLVLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROV_ED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND AND THE MANUAL SWITCH
C0_MAN_D. IF TH_E-G_ CONTACTS FAIL 0_EN, THE VALVE CAN BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, AND
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND UNLESS THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER RCS.































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 S31
33V73A7S26; S31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE SWITCH
AND MDM OPEN COMMANDS. FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE AMD LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1755
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN














PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM .........
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS _ _ ........
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 11,
i_ _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/_ _:I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S26; $31
]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN
BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY


















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA














DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _ ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED














PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7S26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS. IF THE
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, AND CAN BE CLOSED AND
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, AND LOSS OF THE VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1757
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORB IT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS23, DS24; PNL 07 DS25, DS26
33V73A7DS23, DS24; DS25, DS26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
AFT L/R RCS CROSSFEED 1/2 & 3/4/5 POSITION INDICATION WOULD
FALSELY SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX VALVES
ARE STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE
WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF









































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV i/2 SWITCH
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS7; PNL 07 DS10
33V73A7DS7; DSI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1759
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSES SMEN-T -











L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS











SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM _ _ _ ....._ _ _
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS8, DS9; PNL 07 DSII, DSI2
33V73DS8, DS9; DSII, DSI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW
A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE
STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF


















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, DA, CA



















MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] " C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI3-DSI7; PNL 07 DSI8-DS22
33V73A7DSI3-DSI7; DSI8-DS22




AFT RCS MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5 L/R POSITION INDICATION WOULD
FALSELY SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B
VALVES ARE STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION
MISMATCH BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE
WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
=
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1761
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1860 ABORT:
ITEM: L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT205; 52V42PT305
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DI??ICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.













REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:. A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT205; 52V42PT305
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1763
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT207; 52V42PT307
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.












REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



















L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER:" 51V42PT207; 52V42PT307
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w











L/R ULLAG PPRE   S OR

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS S_SOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT206; 52V42PT306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS woRKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT206; 52V42PT306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICU-LTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
= r
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1767
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1866 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS sENsoR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT208; 52V42PT308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.









3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX TK
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT208; 52V42PT308 .......
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1769
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












L/R FU TANg _P'I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT203; 52V42TT303
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.

































L/R FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.











SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L/R FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A C ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT203; 52V42TT303
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANKLEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
=
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT204; 52V42TT304
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
L/R OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT204; 52V42TT304
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1773
E=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC22
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1775
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1777
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1876 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILSON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS-FR_FIRINGBY INH-I--BITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BYCLOSING THE APPR--OPRIATE ISO_Tf0%
VALVE.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IRPCI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVERS.
OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL.
DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED
ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. WITH THE LOSS
OF THE GATE SIGNAL TO THE VERNIER DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS, THE
ONORBIT VERNIER JETS ARE UNAVAILABLE. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDV, PROX OPS) CRIT 3/2R. AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1779
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



















4) MANIFOLD 1/LS, RJDA






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132RPC8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HI GHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132RPC8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1781
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1880 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER









4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA





SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPCI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPCI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FoR ATTI_DE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1783
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1882 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3. TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPC36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OFTHE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1785
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMEN _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1884 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER









4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA





SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
O_O_RBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI 31RPC23
CAUSES| CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO) .
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1789
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











































AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPCI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF _ MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. A FFEC_TS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, AT0),




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWRREQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1791
IND'.PENDENT ORBITER ASS_SSM_.NT




ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ 2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL, DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WI_AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132RPC17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT' MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1793
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:



















R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPC7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE





















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
g









ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32RPC7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS AND LOGIC.
OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL.
DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED
ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. WITH THE LOSS
OF THE GATE SIGNAL TO THE VERNIER DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS, THE
ONORBIT VERNIER JETS ARE UNAVAILABLE. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS) CRIT 3/2R. AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1795
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A133RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1797
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131RPC21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
FOR FCS CHECKOUT.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A13 IRPC21
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TOMANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSOAVAILABLEFOR - A?TITUD E CONTROL_D_ING_ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTis. _
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1799
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCIT"
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION
VALVE.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPCI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT, AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REF
ERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1801
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.




























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
_mm
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1803
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSM_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER
FAILS ON, THE CREW CANPREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE
ISOLATION VALVE.








































































AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IRPC41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS L5LAND L5D MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.




























ORBITE_ _UBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF L5L AND L5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1807
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH

















FLIGHT P_SE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS LSLAND L5D MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS woRKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF L5L AND L5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
u






REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1809
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGHPROPEL_TS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1811
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A3CRI
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAI_BLE FOR ATTITUDE CONT_6_. __G ENTRY, _SSDI_THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[ F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL _NOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32A2CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION___ MAY=AFFEC _
_NT _F_BE_ENTHE _O DIFFERENT B-USES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER
JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS _DBOOK


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
-- DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1913 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE




























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY S, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR7
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING ABORTS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, THE
LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1815
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/Ft_C - ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTO I_F: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3_/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAICR4 .............
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CUP_R_E_N_TFLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT S_I-NG. THE 1.2_
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
•PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDV, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1817
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
















REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1818
I
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1819
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1821
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:



































AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32A2CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT_ FLOW BE_EN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES_ DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132A2CR8
B [F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER
JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1823
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















4) MANIFOLD I/L5, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1825
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
IX)CATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132AICR3
B [F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK _DING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1827
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDU_.DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.

































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR8
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1829
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT







































AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWERLATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1831
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY _Os DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33A2 CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1833
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:......

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO-DIFFERENT BusEs. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS _ ALSO AVAILAB_IfE FOR ATTTTUDE _C_)_TROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1835
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.













































































AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETs ARE ALSO AVAILABLEFOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1837
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1839
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMA_
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT _COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE_Q ............_ _ _
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: • AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A131A3CR8
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1841
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LO_ATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
S4V76AI 3IA2 CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A2CRI
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CGSAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND _NT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPEL_T
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70"943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132A2CRI
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL, DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1845
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/i5/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133A3 CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED
PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
I

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).




REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1847
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTEDDIODEALLOWS__RED_N_T CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1849
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132AICR2
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS' AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1851
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55VT6AI32AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1853
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133A3 CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PT!s. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER
JETS. AFFECTS JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER
JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1855
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT















SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.






















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR4
B IF] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1857
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENTFLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT S_ING. THE 1.2K CU_ENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
suBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A1CR3
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1859
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33A3 CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS _DUNDANTCIRCUIT OPE_TION. MAY AFFECT
C_NT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TOUNE_UAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CUR_NT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER
JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ONORBIT, LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP
DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1861
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 '_
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS RED_UN=D_ANT _IRC_T qPERATIO_ MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT

















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE












































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL, DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).




REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1863
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT S_ING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4," PCA 1
54V76AI31AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).





REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1865
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_TS TO MEETTHE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1867
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 3, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPE_TION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 3, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILAB_ FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1869
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BusEs, DUE TO
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.
_=_ _?_ i_ii _ _ _ _ _ _i _ _ _i _ _






















































4) MANIFOLD 4, RJDA
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AICR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).





































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTE_ DIODE AL_WSREDU_D_CIRCU!T OPERATION. MAY CAUSE A
CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES, DUE TQ_ _
UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CU_ENT S_ING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS CURRENT.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AICRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON THE
LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1873
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC .....ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. _IDrEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MANIFOLD WILL AFF-ECT ANY SCHEDULEDENTRY DTOs OR PTIs' DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [ F] ......
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1875
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. MAY AFFECT
CURRENT FLOW BE_EN THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS
VOLTAGES AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS
MAN!FOLDWLILL A--FFECT-_ _ SCHEDULED-EN-_YDTOS OR PTIs. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT
WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETYBOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1877
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131A3CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT ON CIRCUIT OPERATION.
PROTECT OTHER CIRCUIT.



















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131A3CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1879
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI31A3CR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT ON CIRCUIT OPERATION.
PROTECT OTHER CIRCUIT.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76A13 IA3 CR3
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF R5R AND R5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1881
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT _











FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J9-46 TYPE II
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/8-7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




































A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT. .....





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:









































A[2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1885
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23ARJ9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CH-ECKOUT, .....




























INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSM %T
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1887
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




































B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THECREW--CANPREVENTJETS FROMFIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1889
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P ] ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR'J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS ?ROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT. -....





















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J9-46 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED


















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK g
m











ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J9-45 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). _FFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS KANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1893
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76A121AR J9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J9-47 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).





































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J9-45 (182) TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED
OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.

















REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1896
nmm
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J9-45 (182) TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
W
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1897
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1996 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS LSLAND LSD MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A121AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD L5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF L5L AND L5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1899
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_c ....... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRErLAUNCH: 3/3 rRTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [.. ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
POWERSUPPLIEDTO VERNIERJETSRSRAND RSD MANIFOL_D_VER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER COMSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J4-7 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF R5R AND R5D VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J6-K TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS RSRAND RSD MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER COMSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY













REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-K TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF RSR AND RSD VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.
=





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1903
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J6-X TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JETS RSR AND RSD MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER
CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER COMSUMPTION. IF
MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT
JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY
CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:



















SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J6-X TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER MANIFOLD R5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS
OF RSR AND RSD VERNIER JETS, AND RESULTING IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS.





REPORT DATE 3120187 C-1905
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1907
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ABLE TO SWITCH RJDA BUS A POWER. LOSS OF 1 OF 2 PWR SOURCES
TO MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 4 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF A MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ABORT CRITICALITY IS 3/3 SINCE THE
POWER LATCHING RELAY WAS SWITCH TO "ON" PRIOR TO LIFTOFF (OPS-9).
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ABLE TO SWITCH RJDA BUS B POWER. LOSS OF 1 OF 2 PWR SOURCES
TO MANIFOLDS 1 AND 3 DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS
ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ABORT CRITICALITY IS 3/3 SINCE THE
POWER LATCHING RELAY WAS SWITCHED TO "ON" PRIOR TO LIFTOFF (OPS-
9). AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1909
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 _GIC POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. IF BOTH LOGIC
POWER INPUTS AND _TCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. D_ _ENTRY, THE ....
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 LOGIC POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. IF BOTH LOGIC
POWER INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. DURING ENTRY, THE
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSSOF-A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ONORBIT,
THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1911
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEO_IT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CO_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THE_AL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS _ A_O AVAI_B_ FOR ATTI_DE CONTROL. D_ING ENTRY, _SS
OF THE M_IFOLD WILL AFFECT _Y SCHEDU_D ENTRY _Os OR PTIs.
D_ING RT_, THE _SS OF A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_TS TO MEET THE
T_ _DING CONST_INTS _D CG SAFETY BO_D_IES DUE TO THE
T_PPED PROPEL_ WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPE_TIONS
(_DZ, PRox OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP _NGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (_DZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).





REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1913
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA,
ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















































4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1915
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2 R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT ABLE TO SWITCH RJDA BUS C POWER. LOSS OF 1 OF 2 PWR SOURCES
TO MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4 DRIVER POWER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF A MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. D_ING RTLS, THE _SS OF A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. ABORT CRITICALITY IS 3/3 SINCE
THE POWER LATCHING RELAY WAS SWITCHED TO "ON" PRIOR TO LIFTOFF
(OPS-9). AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS' OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD(SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1917
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... ....
LOSS OF i OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).











































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6F2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 LOGIC POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. IF BOTH LOGIC
POWER INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. DURING ENTRY, THE
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
ONORBIT. THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1919
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R _
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R _:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .....





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
LO$_ OF_O_ 2 LQG_C PO__ SOURCES TO MANIFOLDS. OTHER M_IFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. _B__C ....
POWER INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT. DURING ENTRY, THE
LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR
PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WOULD INHIBIT DUMPING SUFFICIENT TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
SATISFY LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ........
ONORBIT. THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROP OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS _ A_O AVAI_B_ FOR ATTI_DE CONTROL. D_ING ENTRY, _SS
OF THE M_IFOLD WILL AFFECT _ SCHEDUT._D ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
D_ING RT_, THE _SS OF A M_IFOLD (SIX PRIMLY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_TS TO MEET THE
T_K _DING CONST_INTS _D CG SAFETY BO_D_IES DUE TO THE
T_PPED PROPEL_T WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPE_TIONS
(_DZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP _NGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).





































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY
SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).





































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING ENTRY, LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE
TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS
(RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO_, ........................................
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1923
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION: PNL O14 $5
P_T_MBER: 33V73AI4F5
B [P] C [ P]
_USES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: ................
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGI_ AND'DRIVER :
CIR_ITS. O_ER M_IFOLD JETS _ ALSO AVAI_B_ FOR ATTITUDE
























SCHEDUT._D ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RT_, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD _IX PRIVY JETS_ WIL_ CA___T=:?_L __
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS
PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (_DZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT
PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).

















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2023 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:




















LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31 LATCHING RELAY K1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCES FROM FWD MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 4 DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY
DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF AN AFT MANIFOLD (6
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1925
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
FAILS SHORT















LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31 LATCHING RELAY K1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN-A POWER TO AFT
MANIFOLDS i, 2V _D 4 DRIVER CIR_ITS. NO EFFECT, SINCE POWER





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
FAILS OPEN















LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCES FROM AFT MANIFOLDS 1 AND 3 DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs
OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF AN AFT MANIFOLD (6 PRIMARY
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO
THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH
(TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
imm
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1927
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
FAILS SHORT















LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS B
CRITICALITIES












B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN-B POWER TO AFT
MANIFOLDS 1 AND 3 DRIVER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT, SINCE POWER CAN
STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE CORRESPONDING MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
FAILS OPEN














LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER
SOURCES FROM AFT MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4 DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. DURING
ENTRY, LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY
DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF AN AFT MANIFOLD (6
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1929
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
FAILS SHORT















LATCHING RELAY, RJDA BUS C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 LATCHING RELAY K2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN uC POWER=TO AFT ......
MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4 DRIVER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT, SINCE POWER














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I




































FLIGHT PHASE ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1








CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1931
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALI TY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:










































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21R J4-i06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1933
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND






















REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1934
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.






REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1935
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI3 IAIRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRI0
.B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.






REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1937
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ......... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIRII
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.






REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1939
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 .
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] .........
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76Ai32AIRI 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR7
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
r





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1941
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76A132AIR15
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.







































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI32AIRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR47
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1945
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] c[p]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SiX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH _
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS _AND LATCHINGS!GNALS FAIL OF F, LOS=_ OF M_IFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE _SS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTO@ _D PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B.A. O'DONNELL
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








BRE DO HIE aCHY:
i)  U CTRiCAL COMPONE S
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD I/LL, RJDA






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA:







REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIF_D
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) _ WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ..] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI 3IAIRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1949
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 _ HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK







ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1951
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABOR T











B [ ] C [ ] : :
LOCATION:
PART _MBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1953
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1955
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI3 IAIR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.



















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC










ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREEN.S" A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76A132AIR19
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
W
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1959
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS • FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m_






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOP/_SHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32AIR20
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1961
INDEPENDENT oRBITER-A__
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






































A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AIR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
L:




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1963
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/i5/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2062 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]








CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTSq_ND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
























REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1965
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_







ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_ : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 ....
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
P_T_MBER: 56V76AI33AIR36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OV_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BT_ED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YS TEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1967
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
W..
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1969
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.
































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1971
n
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2070 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR39
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [.. ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-104
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1973
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-i04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
i
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1975
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: .3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR27
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1977
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:








































AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR28
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1979
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHESTCRITICALITYk_
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1981
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIR30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1983
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: . A [ B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
•LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI 3IAIR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1985
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c.c ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIR32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1987
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIR32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A133AIR16
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWRON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1989
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 _ HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
P_T NUMBER" 56V76AI33AiRi6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_KSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-i06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1991
D
INDEPENDENT .......ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-i06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1993
b
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON"kS!GNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.




















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1995
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1997
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OPEN RESISTOR 0R DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL 077, _SS O? MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPE_TIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
RE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK























DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1999
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.





















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2001
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI 32AIR28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2003
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76A132AIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.





















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2005
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2007
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR OR DIODE REMOVES THE CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER
LATCHING ON THE LOGIC POWER. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A MANIFOLD
(SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT. IF BOTH
LOGIC PWR INPUTS AND LATCHING SIGNALS FAIL OFF, LOSS OF MANIFOLD
LOGIC POWER AND DRIVER POWER WOULD RESULT FOR BOTH VERNIER AND
PRIMARY. DURING ENTRY, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD WOULD
AFFECT ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER JET
MANIFOLD WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF VERNIER JETS. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS ABORT PROP DUMP
LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2009
_m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND

















REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2010
m
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR51
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:


















4) MANIFOLD 3/R5, RJDA
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT_ 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
























DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCk 3
56V76AI33AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO 0A INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m_
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2013
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ].. B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AIR49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2015
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AiR1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS_DBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2017
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A13 IAIRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2019
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76A131AIRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.





REPORT DATE 3/20187 C-2021
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P_ ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.





























ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI3 IAIRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.








DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.




















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2025
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, ]_CA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI3 IAIRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B.[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23RI41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWRON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2027
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23RI41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR2 "
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2029
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR REMOVES CAPABILITY OF THE DRIVER POWER LATCHING ON
THE LOGIC POWER. DURING ENTRY, LOSS OF THIS MANIFOLD WILL AFFECT
ANY SCHEDULED ENTRY DTOs OR PTIs. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF A
MANIFOLD (SIX PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS
AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS). AFFECTS
ABORT PROP DUMP LENGTH (TAL, AOA, ATO).























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI 33AIR44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2031
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT OFF.






















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWRON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2033
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR40
B C ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDw/F_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBT T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND





































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR41
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2037
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3-
56V76AI33AIR41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK []
g






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133AIR42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2039
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND


























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33AIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2041
mR
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2043
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A13 IAIR43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
•REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31AIR42
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2045
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31AIR42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
J
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2047
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF. THE
BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
DNORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.





































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32AIR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] .C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J2-11
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PWR ON INDICATION TO OA INSTRUMENTATION.





REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2051
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [.. ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22R J2-11
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OA MDM SHOULD RESPOND TO PWR ON/OFF CYCLES.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD
LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM
RJDA BUS A AND B ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A AND B.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
=
w
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2053
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















RJDAIB L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........ _
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND B BY THE L4/R4
AND L3/RS/L3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES, RESPECTIVELY. THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DIRVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD AND
POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND C, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE



































RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2055
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER


















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS _DBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 il
=_




DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2057
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE


















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2












RJDAIB LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB L1/LL/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION , VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS B BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS B. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.












RJDAIB LI/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 015 $4
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S4
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS B POWER FROM RJDA
BUS B DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2061
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS B IS PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS B POWER IS ALSO
PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L1/L5/R1 AND THE L3/R5/R3
MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT













REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
I

















RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2063
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB LI/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
L_N-_NG/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
m






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.


































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ll.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2065
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS II, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS_0-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSCli174, SPACE






















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.












RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2067
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3%3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS A BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
16
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 152 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS A POWER FROM RJDA
BUS A DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ll.10, RCS SIG 2
J
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2069
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 15, 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS A POWER IS
ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE LI/LS/RI, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
mid
I







ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.














RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY _MOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
ABI AND AB2. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FORM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED
POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
REMOVE LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD LI/LS/RI, AND WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2071
i
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2170 ABORT:
ITEM: RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH



















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL O15 S3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD AND
MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS, AND ABORT
DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO

















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 mw


















RJDAIB L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE
RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE LI/L5/RI
MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2073
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE M_FOLD B_ PLA_ING TH_
LI/LL/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUND_CY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND


















REFE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 I




















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2075
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB LI/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE





















RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE LI/L5/R1 MANIFOLDAND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE




REPORT DATE 03122187 C-2077
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB LI/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND



















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2














RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTSFAIL OPEN.















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
w
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2079
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE


















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA
BUS A AND C ONLY BY REWMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A AND C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CASE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND C.
m
i
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii'i0, RCS SIG 2
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2081
INDEPENDENT_ORBITER ASSESSME_ _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2180 ABORT:
ITEM" RJDA1A L2/_2 M_IFOLD DRIVER S_H



















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS A BY THE L4/R4 AND
LI/LS/L! MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY FOR POWER TO RJDA
BUS C IS PROVIDED BY TRHE L3/R5/R3 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR THE DRIVER POWER.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE MANIFOLD AND POWER_TO RJDA BUS B AND C, AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
































RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
i
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2083
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON swITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER




















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 E















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: I/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2085
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE





















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE LDI/LS/RI AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
m
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2087
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS A BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE


































RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS A POWER FROM RJDA
BUS A DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC ii174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ll.10, RCS SIG 2
L
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2089
r 7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L4/R4 AND THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS A
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE LI/LS/RI, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE





























RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2091
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON swITcH coNTAcTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER


















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
W

















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2093
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL C_SED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
I
mm


















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2












RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS C BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO












REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE





















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS C POWER FROM RJDA
BUS C DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2097
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS C IS PROVIDED BY THE L4/R4 AND THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS C
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L2/R2, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L3/RS/R3 MANIVOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
n
i





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY REMOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
CA1 AND CA2. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L2/R2, AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS..
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2099
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP
LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS I,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.














RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE
RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L2/R2 _
MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBI"I _ OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










_DAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD _GIC ON SWIT_ CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL C_SED (SHORTED).










4) MANIFOLD L2/R2, _DAIA
_DAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD _GIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, ME_I_L SHOCK, THE_AL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: _ _ _
DRIVER PO_R _ BE _MOVED FROM T_ _IFOLD BY P_C_G _
L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE C_SED _SITION. FAILURE OF
A_ _D_DANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO _MOVE _GIC AND
DRIVER PO_R FROM _IFOLD L4/R4 _MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPE_TIONS.
_FE_NCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE

































RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2












RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O14 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE










ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L1/LS/RI AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN
THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPEL_S TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2












RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND





















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 W
I













ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.














RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2












RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
I
m





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD
LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM
RJDA BUS B AND C ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS B AND C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2109
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2208 ABORT:
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH



















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES .....

















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONS:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS B BY THE LI/LS/LI
MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. REDUNDANCY FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS C
PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES.
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE
MANIFOLD AND POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND C, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2





































RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2111
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $4
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S4
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER













REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2 g


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2113
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).














RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
HI















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS B AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2












RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS B BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS B. FAILUR_ OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS B POWER FROM P.JDA
BUS B DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
=
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS B IS PROVIDED BY THE LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS B POWER IS ALSO
PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L1/LS/RI AND THE L3/R5/R3
MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2119
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD LOGIc SWITCH IN THE C_SED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2 g


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2121
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE




















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.



































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP
LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS
OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2222 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
13, 14
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BEREMOVED FROM RJDA BUS C BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2







ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATEz 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 15, 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS C POWER FROM RJDA
BUS C DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH
CONTACTS 15, 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS C IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS C POWER IS
ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE L2/R2, THE
L4/R4, AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY REMOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
BCI AND BC2. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED
POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
REMOVE LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L3/RS/R3, AND WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD AND
MAY _FECT_ORBIT OPERATION_ _ DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT ....
DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ANOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii,I0, RCS SIG 2 U
I
i
















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S3
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE RESULTS
IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD
AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
L--
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER pO_R C_ BE REMOVED FROM THE M_IFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/R5/L3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE






















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3120187 C-2131
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
mm
M


















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L1/LS/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH AND
THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L3/RS/R3 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2232 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS
5, 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POUR _BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L3/RS/L3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND















REF_NCES: VS_0_943099 REV B _0 B12, CP_ JSC 11174, SPACE






















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S3
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).












RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 HI
n
n






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY PLACING THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA
BUS A AND C ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A NAD C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11,10, RCS SIG 2
=











RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH



















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/ 2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDA BUS A ANDB BY THE L2/R2
AND L1/LS/L1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. _D_DANCY FOR POWER TO
RJDA BUS C PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR LOSS OF DRIVER POWER.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE MANIFOLD AND POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND C, AND MAY AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2


































RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY AF?ECT 0%6RBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2139
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBsYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2238 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,
2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
oNORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] _C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73A14S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER P0_R C__BE REMOVED FROMTHE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE ......
L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION_ FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4 AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099REV B EO BI_-, cP;_Sc 11174, SPACE



































RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
=
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE











ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.














RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L3/RS/R3 AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).












RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS C BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA-BUS C. ...........................
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE





































RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.





4) MANIFOLD L4/R4, RJDA2A






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS C POWER FROM P.JDA
BUS C DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2












RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTSFAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).












RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 7, 8 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCYTO PREVENT REMOVAL OV RJDA BUS C
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE L2/RS, THE L4/R4, AND THE L3/R5/R3
MANIVOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE

































RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, 10
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER
TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY
DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-2147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R




RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
m


















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
] B [ ] C.[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2149
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS II, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
m
m
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2150
g
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDINGfSAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L1/LS/RIAND THE L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2












RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i_, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM RJDA BUS A BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN
BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO
REMOVE POWER FROM RJDA BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE

































RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE BUS A POWER FROM RJDA
BUS A DUE TO THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).












RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 15, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE POWER PATH THROUGH CONTACT SET 15, 16 TO
RJDA BUS A IS PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE4 LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF RJDA BUS A
POWER IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ON POSITIONS OF THE LI/LS/RI, THE
L2/R2, AND THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCHES. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL RESET IN THE LOSS OF POWER TO RJDA BUS A.I
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE


























DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.














RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOGIC POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY REMOVING POWER TO CONTROL BUSSES
CA2 AND CA3. DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY
PLACING THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILLCAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER FROM MANIFOLD L4/R4, AND WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2155
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND ABORT DUMP
LENGTHS. FAILURE DURING RTLS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE































RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 1,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER ON SWITCH CONTACTS. FAILURE RESULTS
IN THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND
MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2157
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS I,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).


































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L4/R4 ........ DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
am
m














RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICAiITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II,i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2159
i
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICAL_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL _
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:











REFE_NCES: VS70-943099m_V B EO B12,CP;JSC 11174,SPACE




















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE L2/R2 AND THE L3/R5/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCHES AND THE LATCHING BUS POWER RELAY. FAILURE RESULTS IN
THE LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE L4/R4 MANIFOLD AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2161
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC ON SWITCH CONTACTS S, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE _MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE
L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE LOGIC AND












REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
I














1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
2261 ABORT: 3/3
RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-2163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 $5
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.I0, RCS SIG 2 im
im
m


















RJDAIB MANIFOLD LI/RI/L5 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.















RJDAIB MANIFOLD L1/R1/L5 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD
PART NUMBER: MANIFOLD LI/RI/L5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN
BE DONE ON CRITICAL JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ














RJDAIAMANIFOLD L2/R2 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.












RJDAIA MANIFOLD L2/R2 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD
PART NUMBER: MANIFOLD L2/R2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN
BE DONE ON CRITICAL JETS.





































RJDA2B MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.















RJDA2B MANIFOLD L3/R3/R5 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN
BE DONE ON CRITICAL JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03127187 C-2167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RJDA2AMANIFOLD L4/R4 TRICKLE TEST
FAILURE MODE: TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.















RJDA2A MANIFOLD L4/R4 TRICKI_ TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
AFT RCS JETS. ENTRY MAY BE DELAYED SO THAT A HOT FIRE TEST CAN












REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
mm
mm





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RCS ACTIVITY LIGHTS
FAILURE MODE: LIGHTS FAIL OFF OR ON.

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD
PART NUMBER: ALL MANIFOLDS
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW HAS NO VISUAL INDICATION WHAT AXIS AND DIRECTIONS JETS ARE
FIRING IN OR IF THE ELEVON DRIVE RATE IS SATURATED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.











MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT210, 51V42PT209; 52V42PT310, 52V42PT309
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE CREW AND
GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY _
MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.






















DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 1 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT2i0, 51V42PT209; 52V42PT310, 52V42PT309
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE CREW AND
GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY
MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2171
J
UINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.











MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT212, 51V42PT217; 52V42PT312, 52V42PT317
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A








































L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT212, 51V42PT217; 52V42PT312, 52V42PT317
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX OR FU M_IFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT219, 51V42PT214; 52V42PT319, 52V42PT314
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
































L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 3 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT219, 51V42PT214; 52V42PT319, 52V42PT314
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2175
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT216, 51V42PT221; 52V42PT316, 52V42PT321
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A




















REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2176
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.











MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU
L/R OX OR FU MANIFOLD 4 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT216, 51V42PT221; 52V42PT316, 52V42PT321
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2177
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OXMANIFO_ 1 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD i, L/R OX
L/R OX MANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT208; 52V42TT308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE GROUND AND
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE
BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.





































L/R OXMANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX
L/R OX MANIFOLD 1 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT208; 52V42TT308
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE SENSOR WILL CAUSE GROUND AND
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE
BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OX _IFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERA_ THAN ACTUAL.














MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX
L/R OX MANIFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT2XX; 52V42TT3XX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEMi ARCS FLIGHT:






L/R OXMANIFOLD 5 TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.





4) MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT2XX; 52V42TT3XX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING A
LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
L
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK












L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA,
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
















L/_ CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A; 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2281 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS _[A, _
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
















L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A; 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2183
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2282 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA,
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.

















L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/ROMS POD, RCSMANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A; 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDA]_CYMANAi2EMENT WILL ANNOUNCE_fEJET AS FAILE_ON, BUT



















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK mm
I






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2283 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.






5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42EN L4L;
52V42ENRIL, 52V42ENR2L, 52V42ENR3L, 52V42ENR4L
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2284 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R C_MBER P_SS_ (Pc) SENSOR, T_USTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAIL_ MODE: INDI_TES _R P_SS_ T_ A_AL.






5) L/R C_BER P_SS_ (Pc) SENSOR,





_USTE_ LIL, L2L, L3L,
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P_ _CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEO_IT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
_TION: L/R OMS POD, RCS M_IFO_S _D T_USTERS
PUT _MBER: 5iV42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42EN L4L;
52V42E_IL, 52V42E_2L, 52V42E_3L, 52V42E_4L
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THE_AL
SHOCK, OVE_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_ :


































ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
z






5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42EN L4L;
52V42ENRIL, 52V42ENR2L, 52V42ENR3L, 52V42ENR4L
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL,
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
















L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L, LSD, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5L, 51V42ENL5D, 51V42ENRSR, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THER_MAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL,
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
















L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL, L5D, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5L, 51V42ENLSD, 51V42ENRSR, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2288 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL,
LSD, RSR, RSD
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42ENLSL, 51V42ENL5D, 51V42ENR5R, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















REFERENCES: VS70"943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2289 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.






5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D; 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2191
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2290 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.






5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D; 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2291 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.






5) L/R CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D; 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2292 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA,
L3A, RIA, R3A
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
















L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA, L3A, RIA,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A, 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
































L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR THRUSTER LIA,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, 51V42ENL3A, 52V42ENRIA, 52V42ENR3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIG_ST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2294 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX OR _ INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, T_USTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAIL_ MODE: INDICATES HIG_R TEMPE__ T_ AC_AL.






5) L/R OX OR _ INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, T_USTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,






FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_CATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS M_IFOLDS _D T_USTERS
P_T _MBER: 51V42ENLIL, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42ENL4L,
52V42E_IR, 52V42E_2R, 52V42E_3R, 52V42E_4R
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
C_W MAY M_ BAD DECISION BASED ON E_ONEOUS DATA.

















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2295 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL,
L2L, L3L, L4L, RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.






5) L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIL, L2L, L3L,






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL!L, 51V42ENL2L, 51V42ENL3L, 51V42ENL4L,
52V42ENRIR, 52V42ENR2R, 52V42ENR3R, 52V42ENR4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK













L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L,
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
















L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L, L5D, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLSL, 51V42ENLSD, 51V42ENR5R, 51V42ENR5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







































L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS L5L,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
















L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LSL, LSD, R5R,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5L, 51V42ENL5D, 51V42ENRSR, 51V42ENRSD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2298 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.






5) L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4U,






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D, 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONA Z: n














REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK I
I





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2299 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU,
L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D, RIU, R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.






5) L/R OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS LIU, L2U, L4Ui






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, 51V42ENL2U, 51V42ENL4U, 51V42ENL2D,
51V42ENL3D, 51V42ENL4D, 52V42ENRIU, 52V42ENR2U, 52V42ENR4U,
52V42ENR2D, 52V42ENR3D, 52V42ENR4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2201
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR JII-F; JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE, _ _




















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORB IT: 3/ IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2







CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2203
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2302 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JII-H; Jll-I
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR JI1-H; Jll-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR Jll-F; AR JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR JII-F; AR JII-G
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR JII-H TYPE III; AR Jll-I (181) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR JII-H TYPE III; AR Jll-I (181) TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS.
w REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2209
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A!23AR J8-73 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT OR RIGHT MANIFOLD 5.
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J8-73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATION OF THERMOSTAT IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY WILL PREVENT
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANT. CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER
SWITCHES. OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS. VERNIER
THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2211
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _CS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE__: 3/3 RT_: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3





mUSES: CONT_INATION, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2213
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL" VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2215
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4F31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD 5. VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23F
,CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT OR RIGHT MANIFOLD 5.
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN















HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C[P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, L3A; 52V42ENRIA, R3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITY. PROPELLANT WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS OPEN















HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY' Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; 52V42ENRIR, R2R, R3R,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILS OPEN










3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, L2U, L2U, L2D, L3D, L4D; 52V42ENRiU,
R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D;
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FI_IH THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET's
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS















REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK i






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
FAILS SHORT















HEATER 30W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, L3A; 52V42ENRIA, R3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND WILL AFFECT THE +X JET
RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITY. PROPELLANT WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS
DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS SHORT















HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; 52V42ENRIR, R2R, R3R,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_
RED_DANCY PRQYI_ED BY T_USTE_RS WHICH FIRE IN T_ SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY D_iNG ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHIC_ DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILS SHORT















HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU, L2U, L2U, L2D, L3D, L4D; 52V42ENRIU,
R2U, R4U, R2D, R3D, R4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME,
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2223
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILS OPEN















HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
51V42ENL5D; 51V42ENLSL; 52V42ENRSD; 52V42ENRSR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR VERNIER JETS. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET
WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS,
THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET. FAILURE WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.









































HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILS SHORT















HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5D; 51V42ENLSL; 52V42ENR5D; 52V42ENRSR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR VERNIER JETS. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET
WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS,
THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET. FAILURE WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK












ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 1 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TAI/(BACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03127187 C-2227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 2 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, ExcE_ BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TALKBACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2229
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT M_!FOLD 3 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TALKBACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:





































B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




































c [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 4 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER
TEMPERATURES. THERE ARE NO TALKBACKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
SWITCH.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2233
WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROUND AND CREW CANNOT DETERMINE IF "AFT MANIFOLD 5 JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH" IS WORKING, EXCEPT BY MONITORING THRUSTER























ORBITER EUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J4-44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).














THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
51V42ENLIA, L3A; RIA, R3A
CAUSES: CO_AMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND WILL AFFECT THE +X JET
RCS DEORBIT CAPABILITY. PROPELLANT WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS
















REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95 m
B





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).














THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] c[P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIA, L3A; RIA, R3A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURECONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROP_LANTS COULD CAU&_EZOTS, L_ADING_-LOSS D?VEHICLEIN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2237
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).














THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).














THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIL, L2L, L3L, L4L; RIR, R2R, R3R, R4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS, LEADING TO LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2239
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).














THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENLIU , L2U, L4U, L2D , L3D, L4D; RIU, R2U, R4U,
R2D, R3D, R4D
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION_ _-PR__T IN THIS_E_-_ILL_FREEZE_ONORBiT. IF JET'S
TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS, THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET.
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. PROPELLANTS
WILL NOT FREEZE IN JETS DURING ABORTS DUE TO LACK OF TIME.




















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).














THRUSTERS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
51V42ENLIU, L2U, L4U, L2D, L3D, L4D; RIU, R2U, R4U,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS, LEADING TO LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-224!
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).














THRUSTERS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES












S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: " L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: SlV42ENLSD; RSD ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR VERNIER JETS. PROPELLANT IN THIS JET
WILL FREEZE ONORBIT. IF JET'S TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW LIMITS,
THE RM WILL DESELECT THIS JET. FAILURE WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).










3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS THRUSTER ASSEMBLIES
PART NUMBER: 51V42ENL5D; R5D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES, BUT C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THE HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. OVERHEATING OF
PROPELLANTS COULD CAUSE ZOTS, LEADING TO LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY
FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JET IS USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC ......
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF P-ROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT





















REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
g
m





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
OPERATIONS ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.














MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: .2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RSIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.















MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2247
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL z
g
g



















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROLSWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.















MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD _-
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUND_CY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT B_RS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD-_
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.














MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MAIFOLD.
OPERATIONS ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2251
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPEL_T IN ...... WILLJETS FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPE_TIONS AND ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS.
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.














MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [









] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL "
SHO_, __A_ _- _ _: _:_ _:_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NON ,Tm SECONTACTS NOT IN A C R6U .
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT















REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
U
u











ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
OPERATIONS ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
w
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2257
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.










3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS







REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]











CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVER_AD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ .............................................
PROPELLANT IN JETSWILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OFALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.


































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2259
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH cONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2261
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT













REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
mm
m






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S12
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD, L
OPERATIONS ENTRY DETOS AND PTIS.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER COBOL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.










3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S12
PART aMBER: 36V73A14S12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.




3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4 JETS























CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL












MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL mm
I
I





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3_3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2267
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.














MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:






MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE "HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2269
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:







MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE.
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD.
THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS




































MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-2271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


































MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099, REV B EO BI2, DL, CL
















































HE ISOL A & B VLVS
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS
REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS
REGULATOR
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY
SENSING PORT
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY
SENSING PORT
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET
TEST PORT COUPLING
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT








PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT
CHANNEL CHECKOUT COUPLING
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT
CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT
BULKHEAD BLEED COUPLING






FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS











FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN), OR LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN) OR LEAKS (REVERSE
FLOW)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)











FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY












































PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL &
DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD I, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 2, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 3, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 4, GROUNDPURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING





JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES

















BURST DISK RUPTURES AT LOW " u
PRESSURE, OR LEAKS
BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE,
RUPTURES AT A HIGHER THAN
NOMINAL PRESSURE, OR POPPET g
VALVE FAIL





FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN), m
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY u
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)






















































THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
PRIMARY, Z AXIS
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER




HE ISOL A & B VLVS
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV
TO PRESS REGULATOR
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS
REGULATOR













OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING







FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
0PEN/ON)















FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS











FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN), OR LEAKS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS












































PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT
CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING






GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
PROP TANK ISOLVLV 3/4/5/ A & B







FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN), OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY





BURST DISK RUPTURES AT LOW
PRESSURE, OR LEAKS
BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE,
RUPTURES AT A HIGHER THAN
NOMINAL PRESSURE, OR POPPET
VALVE FAIL





FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
COUPLING OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
_IFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
COUPLING
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
CROSSFEED LINES
CROSSFEED LINES




FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS INTERNALLY










































MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN
COUPLING
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV








THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, +X AXIS
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, Y AXIS
298 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
PRIMARY, Z AXIS
299 JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
300 JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
301 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
302 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
303 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
304 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
305 THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS,
VERNIERS, ALL AXES
306 THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER
OR NOZZLE EXTENSION, PRIMARY,
ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN),
OR LEAKS EXTERNALLY
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED)





















FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN/ON)













































































HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS Ii, 12
HE 0X & FU ISOL VLV A OR B































































































































































OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
OX _ FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5












































SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
















































































MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 3, OX _ FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, OX &-FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV





























SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN _
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED





































































































































RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON















































SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAILS
OPEN


































RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF
SWITCH CONTACTS7, 8
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDFIBFi MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH ON CONTACTSi, 2
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTSI, 2
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTS5, 6
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF
SWITCH CONTACTS7, 8
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH ON CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON
SWITCH CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH ON CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER
ON SWITCH CONTACTSi, 2
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC
SWITCH
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC




DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
RJDF2B LL/FL/R5 MANIFOLD






HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER,
ALL AXES
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED (SHORTED)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED (SHORTED)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN


































































MANIFOLD i, _ HEATER
CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 1
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 2
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 3
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS
FWD RCS JET 4
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL

























SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCHFAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN
OFF POSITION)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN)








































































L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B











































SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN




SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN

























































































































L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTSI, 2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS5, 6
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTSii, 12
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
A OR B SWITCH OPENCONTACTS1,2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS5, 6
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
FEED FROM RIGHT OR FEED FROM
LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV
3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1,2
L/R OX & FU CR0SSFEED VLV 3/4/5






























SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH FAILS IN FEED FROM
RIGHT OR FEED FROM LEFT
POSITION
SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED







































SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 2, L/R 0X & FU IS0L
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV'SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN COMMAND i, 2
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE COMMAND 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
MANIFOLD 5, L/R 0X & FU ISOL
VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL





















SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL
CLOSED




















































































































































































































































RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH






RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER
SWITCH


















HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER,
_ALL AXES

















SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION




















FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS
CLOSED)
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS
OPEN)

































MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL
OPEN
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF
POSITION
SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
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